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Handelman: Federal Jurisdiction

FEDERAL JURISDICTION
SULLIVAN v. FIRST AFFILIATED
SECURITIES: WHEN WILL THE "ARTFUL
PLEADING DOCTRINE" SUPPORT
REMOVAL OF A STATE CLAIM TO
FEDERAL COURT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, l the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the U. S. Supreme Court's application of the artful
pleading doctrine in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie 2
and reviewed the Ninth Circuit's earlier application of the artful
pleading doctrine in Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Association. 3 The Ninth Circuit concluded that where a plaintiff has
filed parallel securities actions in federal court and in state
court, and where the state claim is not precluded by the res judicata effect of a federal judgment, the defendant may not use the
artful pleading doctrine to remove the state claim to federal
court.4
II. FACTS
Plaintiffs were thirty-four investors!> who purchased stock in
1. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Wiggins, J.; the other panel members were
Schroeder, J., and Thompson, J.), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3093 (U.S. July 17,
1987) (No. 87-102).
2. 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
3. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
4. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370, 1376.
5. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). Twenty
three of the investors, including Sullivan, were individuals; other investors were corporations, limited partnerships, pension plans and trusts. Id. at 1368. Most were California
residents. Id. at 1370.
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Midwestern Companies. 6 Defendants were a brokerage firm,
First Affiliated Securities, Inc., its broker, and insiders of Midwestern Companies (collectively "FAS-Midwestern").? The investors filed two suits against FAS-Midwestern. One suit was
filed in California state court alleging claims under California
state law. s A second suit was filed in federal court alleging substantially the same facts but asserting claims under federallaw. 9
The state action was filed in February of 198510 and the federal
action was filed the following month, before serving summons in
the state action. l l
The defendants, FAS-Midwestern, removed the state action
to federal court.12 The investors moved to remand the state action to state court claiming that the federal court had no removal jurisdiction over the state claim. IS The district court denied the motion to remand. 14 The district court reasoned that
the investors, by filing their federal claim shortly after filing
their state claim to redress essentially the same injury, had affirmatively elected to avail themselves of a federal forum. lIS The
district court concluded that under Moitie 16 and Salvesonl ? the
plaintiff's contemporaneous filing of federal and state claims
6. Id. at 1370.
7. Id. First Affiliated Securities is a California firm and Midwestern Companies is a
Missouri based corporation. Id. Insiders at Midwestern included its former officers, directors, accountants and attorneys. Id.
8. Id. Investors' state claims included allegations of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty under California common law. Id. Investors also alleged
violations of California's Blue Sky securities laws (Cal. Corp. Code §§ 1507(a), 2254,
25401, and 25402 (West 1977». Id. at 1370.
9. Id. The investors asserted claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq., (1982) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
10. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370.
11.Id.
12. Id. at 1370-71.
13. Id. at 1371. Although the investors apparently preferred to proceed in the state
court under state law, they filed the federal action to obtain collateral discovery that
could also be used in the state action and to protect against the possibility that the state
court would lack personal jurisdiction over the Midwestern insiders. [d. at 1370 n.2.
14. Id. at 1371.
15.Id.
16. Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). See infra notes 5163 and accompanying text.
17. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See
infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
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amounted to "artful pleading,"l8 and that the plaintiff's state
claim could be properly removed by the defendant to federal
court.19 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the investors' petition for interlocutory appeal in order to consider
whether or not the state claim should be remanded to state
court.20
III. BACKGROUND
A.

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The
Constitution limits the power of the judiciary to certain very
specific classes of cases and controversies, including cases "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States."21 Congress created the lower federal courts, and by statute the federal courts have jurisdiction over those cases "arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."22
The meaning of the words "arising under" thus assumes both a
constitutional dimension and a statutory dimension: 23 Congress
has no power
under the Constitution to grant the federal courts jurisdiction
over cases that do not "arise under" federal law; Congress did
not intend, when enacting the federal question statute, to confer
jurisdiction over cases not "arising under" federallaw.24
18. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371.
19. [d.

20. [d. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the investors' petition to file an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). [d. That section provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so
state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
such order, if application is make to it within ten days after
the entry of the order ....
28 U.S.C § 1292(b) (1982).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
23. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.3, at 16-19 (1985)
[hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER].
24. [d. See generally Powers v. South Cent. United Food and Commercial Workers
Unions, 719 F.2d 760, 763 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing numerous cases and commentaries
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A plaintiff is said to be "master of his complaint."215 It is the
plaintiff who assesses his claim and determines whether it arises
under state law, federal law, or both.26 Ordinarily, if a plaintiff
has a remedy under state law and also has a remedy under federal law he may choose to litigate in either forum, or he may
pursue his claim in both the federal and state courts.27
Removal jurisdiction permits a defendant to force the plaintiff to litigate certain actions in federal court, rather than in the
state forum the plaintiff originally selected.28 The federal removal statute provides that an action is removable only if it
could have been brought originally in federal court.29 The removal statute further provides that claims which arise under
federal law are removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties.30
analyzing the "arising under" component of federal subject matter jurisdiction). See also
Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 978 (1979) (a thorough
discussion of "arising under" requirement for attachment of federal jurisdiction).
25. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers' Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22
(1983) (removal of actions filed in state court only proper if a federal question appears
on the face of a properly pleaded complaint). See also The Fair v. Kohler Die and
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). (Holmes, J.) ("Of course the party who brings a
suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon .•.. ")
26. 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 0.160, at 231-32 (2d ed.
1987). [hereinafter MOORE & RINGLE]

27. [d. See also California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir. 1979). In Hawaiian Sugar, the plaintiff sought state court relief for antitrust violations. [d. at 1271. Defendant thereafter removed the action to federal court. [d. The
court of appeals remanded the case to state court stating that there is nothing improper
about pursuing state claims in state court while pursuing federal claims in federal court
arising from the same operative facts. [d. at 1272, 1274.
28. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. See also C. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 212 (4th ed. 1983) (because removal jurisdiction is derivative, if the state court lacks jurisdiction over a case, the federal court cannot acquire
jurisdiction through removal).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States ..••"
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides: "Any other such action shall be removable
only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) the parties were not of completely diverse citizenship;
therefore, the defendants claimed that the federal court had removal jurisdiction because
the plaintiffs' state claim actually arose under federal law. [d. at 1371 and n.3.
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THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT

Normally, a defendant may only remove an action filed in
state court to federal court based on a federal question if the
federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint_ 31 Theoretically, removal jurisdiction could be
viewed as a way for the federal court to hear what should have
been before it in the first instance_ 32 If the plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint shows a federal claim on its face, the defendant will not be deprived of a federal forum just because the
plaintiff happened to file the complaint in state court_33
A long standing corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule
is that the defendant cannot have the plaintiff's case removed to
federal court simply because he asserts a federal defense, even if
his entire defense is based on federallaw_ 34 Thus, the circumstances under which a defendant may remove an action involving a federal question from state court to federal court are very
narrow, consisting almost exclusively of instances where the face
31. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.) (ordinarily,
defendant may remove an action to federal court only if a federal question appears on
the face of a well-pleaded complaint), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986). See Gully v.
First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (applying what is now called the "well-pleaded
complaint rule" in a removal context). Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court which said that a "genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible
or conjectural one, must exist ... and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of
the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal." (citations omitted)
ld. at 113. The Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the well-pleaded complaint rule
as fundamental to the determination of removal jurisdiction in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
32. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57. "In a case involving a
claim raising an issue of federal law, removal equalizes the ability of both parties to have
a federal question litigated in its 'natural' forum." ld. See also Norton, Recent Development: Removal Doctrine Reaffirmed: Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1985) (a survey of federal removal jurisdiction, the
well-pleaded complaint rule in a removal context, and removability of state court actions
for declaratory judgments).
33. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & MILLER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57.
34. Hunter v. United Van Lines 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 106
S.Ct 180 (1985) (even though the defendants have a real and substantial interest in having their preemption defense heard in federal court, such an interest is not a cognizable
basis for federal removal jurisdiction). See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149 (1908) (federal jurisdiction is lacking even if defense is based on federal
law). The logic of denying removal jurisdiction to a defendant who raises a federal defense has been questioned by various authorities including the American Law Institute,
but Congress has not seen fit to permit removal unless the plaintiff relies on federal law.
Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d 1368, 1372 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).
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of the plaintiff's complaint discloses a cause of action arising
under federallaw. 315 The source of removal is purely statutory,
and removal itself represents an intrusion upon the judicial
power of the state courts.36

c.

THE ARTFUL PLEADING DOCTRINE

Occasionally, a plaintiff may realize that his claim is one
that arises under federal law but does not want to proceed in
federal court. 37 If the plaintiff characterizes his essentially federallaw claim as a state claim, omitting all mention of the applicable federal law, and files the complaint in state court, the
plaintiff has engaged in "artful pleading."3s If the defendant
then attempts to remove what he believes to be a federal claim
to federal court, the court will be permitted to look behind the
face of the complaint. The court will seek to determine whether
the real nature of the claim is federal regardless of the plaintiff's
characterization. 39 Thus, the artful pleading doctrine, which permits the court to look behind the face of the complaint to determine the true nature of the plaintiff's claims, represents an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which ordinarily
35. Norton, supra note 32, at 557 and n.6.
36. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE, & Mn.LER, supra note 23, § 2.11 at 57.
37. Most cases where a plaintiff may try to circumvent the proper federal forum and
file in state court involve situations where federal law completely preempts state law on
a subject but if state law applied, plaintiff would have a remedy, perhaps a better one
than is available under federal law. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, 702 F.2d
189, 190 (9th Cir. 1980) (airline employee brought an action for wrongful demotion under
state law, removed to federal court and dismissed); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615
F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1980) (action in state court relating to employee-management altercation preempted by Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1982». The artful pleading doctrine has also been applied to permit federal court jurisdiction through removal in a few cases where plaintiff has already been denied a remedy
under federal law but tries to get relief by stating the same claim in state court under
state law. See, e.g., Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (discussed infra at notes 51-63 and accompanying text); and Salveson v. Western States
Bankcard Ass'n., 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra at notes 62-73 and accompanying text).
38. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986)
(employee's state claim for unlawful termination and negligent failure to process a union
grievance removed to federal court and dismissed). But cf. illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 575 (7th Cir.) (state action regarding disposal of radioactive
waste not removable because it was not properly before the state court), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1049 (1982).
39. 14A C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3722,266-70 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
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permits removal only when the federal question appears on the
face of the complaint."o
Artful pleading has been colorfully described by various district courts as "a federal case in state wrapping paper,""! "clothing a federal claim in state garb,""2 and a federal claim "in disguise. "43 Artful pleading is said to be the plaintiff's
characterization of a federal claim as a state claim."4 Artful
pleading, however, must be carefully distinguished from the situation where a plaintiff has various separate claims, some arising
under federal law and some arising under state law. If a plaintiff
has causes of action under both state law and federal law, remembering that a plaintiff is "master of his complaint," the
plaintiff is not engaging in artful pleading if he ignores the federal claim and proceeds solely under state law.45 Likewise, the
plaintiff may ignore his state claims and proceed solely under
federal law.46 Occasionally, the plaintiff will decide, as did the
investors in Sullivan, to pursue both federal and state claims in
separate actions."? The plaintiff's genuine state action is not subject to the federal court's removal jurisdiction because the plaintiff has not stated a federal cause of action on the face of his
complaint, nor has the plaintiff attempted to engage in artful
pleading by characterizing a federal claim as a state claim."8
40. 1A MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160, at 233. "The 'artful pleading doctrine' is a narrow exception to the ordinary rules of federal jurisdiction ...." Williams v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 931 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). "The
artful pleading doctrine is to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances as it raises
difficult issues of state and federal relationships and often yields unsatisfactory results."
Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427.
41. Graf, 790 F.2d at 1344.
42. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F. 2d 754, 758 (2nd Cir.) (artful pleading doctrine inapplicable where state law claim, filed after dismissal of a federal "RICO"
action, does not contain elements essential to the federal claim), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
277 (1986).
43. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427.
44. Powers v. South Cent. United Food and Commercial Workers Unions, 719 F.2d
760, 765 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's state law claims for negligence, fraud, deceptive trade
practices not preempted by federal law and removal was improper).
45. 1A MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160, at 231-32. "Plaintiff is, however,
free to ignore the state question and pitch his claim on the federal ground, or ignore the
federal ground and rely on the state ground." (citations omitted.) [d.
46. [d.
47. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F. 2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. See California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (9th
Cir. 1978) (the court found nothing improper where plaintiff pursued both a state action
for restraint of trade and a federal antitrust action arising out of the same operative

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 10

184 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:177

Artful pleading in the removal context is most often encountered when a plaintiff attempts to assert a claim under state
law that has been preempted by federallaw. 49 However, the artful pleading doctrine is occasionally encountered in non-preemption settings as well. 50 The only acknowledgement of artful
pleading by the Supreme Court in a non-preemption setting occured in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie. 51 In Moitie,
plaintiff Brown filed suit against Federated Department Stores
in federal court alleging violations of federal law (Brown I).52
Moitie filed suit against the same defendants in state court
(Moitie I).53 Moitie I was removed to federal court where both
Brown I and Moitie I were dismissed. 54 Moitie and Brown, represented by the same counsel, did not appeal but instead filed
the same cases as new claims in state court (Moitie II and
Brown II).55 Defendants removed Moitie II and Brown II to
federal court and moved to dismiss on grounds of res judicata.56
The district court refused to remand Moitie II and Brown II to
state court holding that the complaints, although artfully
facts).
49. See Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 180 (1985). Preemption removal is a matter of considerable controversy
among the circuits. [d. Courts are struggling with the circumstances under which they
will remove a state claim that was in reality an artfully pleaded federal claim when the
subject matter of the claim has been preempted by federal law. [d. "[T]he better view is
expressed by the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits which have concluded that
the assertion of a defense that federal law has preempted the state law upon which
plaintiff relies does not create a federal question for purposes of the general removal
statute." [d. at 641 (quoting MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 26, § 0.160[4]). See generally
Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 634 (1984) (analysis of removal jurisdiction based on
defendant's allegations of federal preemption).
50. Six relatively recent cases discuss the artful pleading doctrine leading to removal
jurisdiction in a non-preemption setting: Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d
1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (the subject of this Note); Federated Department Stores v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394 (1981) (see infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text); Salveson v. Western
States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984) (see infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text; California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.
1979) (see supra note 27); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986) (see supra note 31); and Reid v. Walsh, 620 F. Supp.
930 (M.D. La. 1985). The Reid court reached a conclusion contrary to the one reached in
Sullivan, holding that a state securities action can be removed to federal court because
plaintiffs filed a federal securities action on the same facts. Reid, 620 F. Supp. at 932.
51. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
52. [d. at 395-96.
53. [d. at 395.
54. [d. at 396.
55. [d.
56. [d.
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couched in terms of state law, were "essentially federal law
claims. "67 The district court also concluded that the doctrine of
res judicata required that Moitie II and Brown II be dismissed
because Moitie II and Brown II involved the same parties, the
same alleged offenses, and the same time periods as Moitie I and
Brown 1.'58 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to remand Moitie II and Brown II to state court and affirmed the lower court's
opinion that they were artfully pleaded state claims. 69 However,
the Ninth Circuit did reverse the district court's conclusion that
the removed state actions were barred by res judicata.60
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's refusal to
bar Brown II and Moitie II based on res judicata.61 In a footnote, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the federal court had removal jurisdiction over Brown II and Moitie II because the purported state
claims were really artfully pleaded federal claims.62 Thus, although artful pleading was suggested in the footnote as the rationale under which the federal court had jurisdiction over the
57.
58.
59.
firming

ld.
ld. at 396-97.
Moitie v. Federated Department Stores, 611 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980) afremoval with the following language:
Appellants first contend that removal was improper because
they stated a valid state law claim. We disagree. The court
below conectly held that the claims presented were federal in
nature, arising solely from price fixing on defendants' part. In
light of our disposition of this appeal, appellants will not quarrel with the result.

ld.
60. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397-98. Recent developments changing the law regarding
Moitie's and Brown's underlying claims caused the Ninth Circuit to find that "simple
justice" and "public poliey" required the doctrine of res judicata to give way and allow
Moitie and Brown a second chance to have their claims considered, even though a final
judgment of dismissal had been previously entered on the same claims. ld.
6!. ld. at 394. "We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 991 (1980), to consider the validity
of the Court of Appeals' novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata." ld. at 398.
A lengthy dissent by Justice Brennan points out that the theoretical underpinnings
for the majority decision are far from clear. ld. at 408-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan states: "The Court today nevertheless sustains removal of this action on
the ground that 'at least some of the claims had a sufficient federal character to support
removal.' ... I do not understand what the Court means by this. Which of the claims are
federal in character? Why are the claims federal in character?" ld. at 409 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
62. ld. at 397 n.2. "[R]espondents had attempted to avoid removal jurisdiction by
'artful[ly]' casting their 'essentially federal law claims' as state-law claims. We will not
question here that finding." ld.
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purported state claims, the Supreme Court was only concerned
in its review of the case with the Ninth Circuit's "novel exception to the doctrine of res judicata."63
The Ninth Circuit, in Salveson v. Western States Bankcard
Association,64 attempted to apply the artful pleading doctrine in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Moitie. 615 In Salveson,
the plaintiff filed a federal antitrust claim against the defendants in federal court.66 The district court eventually granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
suit was barred by the statute of limitations. 6'1 Following entry
of judgment, plaintiffs filed essentially the same claim in Cali63. [d. at 398. The significance of the Moitie decision with respect to removal based
on the artful pleading doctrine has been sharply questioned. In Magic Chef, Inc. v. International Molders and Allied Workers Union, 581 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), defendants argued for removal of state claims based upon Moitie saying that plaintiffs had
artfully pleaded an essentially federal claim, and based upon federal preemption saying
that federal law completely preempts state law in the field of labor relations. [d. at 77475. The court rejected the Moitie argument for removal in a footnote. [d. at 776 n.4. The
footnote contains the following language:
In that case, [Moitie) the Court held that the plaintiff's state
law case was properly removed because "some of the claims
had a sufficient federal character to support removal." One of
the authorities upon which the Court relied has recently attempted to explain this holding (after stating that "several of
the Court's statements about removal .•• are difficult to understand."), 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3722 at 202 (1983) Pocket Part:
"In brief, the Court's only intention in its footnote may
have been a narrow one: to tip the balance in favor of defendant's right to a federal forum and against plaintiff's right to be
master of his claim in antitrust actions when the plaintiff already had availed himself of a federal forum and when his
state claims as removed would be res judicata from the earlier
federal decisions .••." [d. at 203.
It should be noted that the most recent edition of WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 39, § 3722 at 266 cites Moitie in its section regarding artful pleading with no comment whatsoever, except to note that the decision quotes WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER.
The court in Gold v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 50, 53, n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), although most concerned about the master-of-the complaint rule, was
blunt in its criticism of Moitie in dictum: "Although it is perhaps impossible intellectually to reconcile Moitie with established law, it seems proper, absent more direct and
fuller consideration of the issue by the Court, to view the result as an aberration, necessary in light of the unusual facts of that case."
64. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. [d. at 1425.
66. [d.
67. [d. at 1426.
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fornia state court.6S Defendants then removed the state court
suit to federal district court, and there moved to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and statute of limitations.69 The district
court concluded that the state claims were actually artfully
pleaded federal claims and that res judicata properly applied.70
Most of the claims were dismissed with prejudice.71 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, but went further, ordering all
of plaintiffs' state law claims dismissed with prejudice.72 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Salveson's state
claim was indeed an example of artful pleading as articulated in
Moitie. 73 The plaintiffs chose to proceed under federal law in
federal court for four years repeatedly asserting a federal claim
until it was dismissed. 74 Having elected to proceed in a federal
forum and pursue their claim under federal law, it was artful
pleading to later recast the same claims as state claims.76 The
Salveson court reasoned that removal jurisdiction in Moitie was
founded upon the fact that in that case as well, the plaintiff had
previously filed the claims as federal claims in federal court,
thereby electing the federal court as the forum for resolving the
dispute. 76
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities,77 the Ninth Circuit

noted that the investors filed claims in state court and in federal
68. ld. The state law complaint contained seven caus~ of action including allegations of common law fraud, fraudulent inducement to contract, misappropriation of
plaintiffs' programs and ideas, interference with business relations and violation of the
state antitrust statute. ld.
69. ld.
70. ld.
71. ld. The first six causes of action were dismissed with prejudice on statute of
limitations or res judicata grounds. ld. The last cause of action involving violation of the
state antitrust statute was dismissed without prejudice for want of derivative jurisdiction
upon removal to the federal court. ld.
72. ld. at 1433.
73. ld. at 1429.
74. ld.
75. ld.
76. ld. "We agree [with the lower court] that the conclusion af artful pleading is
properly drawn when the plaintiff 'by his own conduct, either by filing originally in federal court or by acceding to federal jurisdiction after removal, has made his claim a federal one.''' ld. (citation omitted).
77. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).
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court arising out of the same core of operative facts. 78 The defendants, FAS-Midwestern, did not contend that federal law
preempted the state claim. 79 The defendants contended only
that the investors engaged in "artful pleading" by filing claims
in both state and federal court on the same operative facts.8o
The Ninth Circuit stated that such an argument was previously
rejected in California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar CO.81 The
court then said that "[w]ere it not for ... Moitie ... , FASMidwestern's argument would be groundless."82 The court acknowledged that it had interpreted Moitie in its earlier
Salveson83 decision, and allowed removal on the basis that the
plaintiffs had elected to pursue their claim in a federal forum
and therefore the state claim was simply their federal claim recast under state law. 84
The Sullivan court observed that the Moitie court had approved removal of the state action to federal court in a footnote
and as pointed out by the Brennan dissent in Moitie, "the task
of divining Moitie's theoretical underpinnings has fallen to the
lower courts and commentators."85 Both Moitie and Salveson
applied the artful pleading doctrine in a non-preemption context, and removal of the state action was permitted in both
cases.86 The Sullivan court examined the possible theoretical bases for asserting removal jurisdiction in Moitie' and Salveson to
determine if the investors' state claim could properly be removed to federal court in light of those two cases.87
The Sullivan court concluded that two possible justifications may be advanced for Moitie's use of the artful pleading
doctrine: (1) plaintiff's election of a federal forum by suing in
federal court (essentially the consent theory articulated in
Salveson88 ), and (2) federal res judicata.89
78. ld. at 1370.
79. ld. at 1372-73.
80. ld. at 1373.
81. 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 27, 48.
82. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373.
83. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984). See
supra notes 64-76.
84. Sullivan, 813 F.2d. at 1373.
85. ld.
86. I d. at 1373-74.
87. ld. at 1373-76.
88. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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The Sullivan court described five flaws in basing Moitie's
removal jurisdiction on an election of forum rationale. (1) The
Supreme Court did not articulate the election theory in Moitie,
and that approach had never been accepted as justifying removal. 90 (2) The election approach is inconsistent with the removal statute. 91 (3) The election justification does not conform
to traditional notions of removal under the artful pleading doctrine-the investors have not failed to plead necessary federal
law. 92 (4) Acceptance of an election theory would expand removal jurisdiction to a significant number of state cases in which
the plaintiff has filed a parallel federal case, contrary to principles of federalism. 93 (5) Attempts to place limits on the election
rationale have been unsatisfactory.9ol
The Sullivan court concluded that the better view is that
removal jurisdiction in Moitie rests on the existence of a res
judicata defense. 911 Moitie can be fairly construed as "permitting
removal only of state claims filed to circumvent the res judicata
impact of a federal judgment."96
89. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373.
90. Id. at 1374.
91. Id. Because "the state and federal claims were filed separately, the state claims
are not pendent, nor within original federal jurisdiction, and do not arise under federal
law." Id.
92. Id. at 1374-75. The state claims are created and governed by state law, even
though they are based on the same operative facts as plaintiffs' federal claims, and in the
absence of preemption cannot be characterized as federal claims. Id.
93. Id. at 1375.
94. Id. The Sullivan court noted that the Second Circuit has allowed removal after
the Moitie decision if the state claim and the federal claim are "substantially similar",
and if the plaintiff first pursued his claim in federal court thereby electing a federal
forum. Id. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
277 (1986). In Sarkisian, plaintiff first filed a RICO claim in federal court, which was
dismissed. Id. at 756-57. Plaintiff then filed a state action based on the same operative
facts alleging various breaches of state law. Id. at 757. The Second Circuit found that the
state action was not "substantially similar" to the federal action because ihe state action
did not allege "a pattern of racketeering activity" or operation of an "enterprise," as did
the federal action. Id. at 761. The Sullivan court argued that "substantial similarity of
claims seems unsound" as the presence of shared elements does not mean that the state
claim arises under federal law. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1375. The Sullivan court further
argued that the order of filing should make no difference if the rationale for removal
rests upon an election of forums rationale. "Regardless of the filing order, the plaintiff
will have elected to use the federal forum ...." Id.
95. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1376.
96. Id. The court also noted that its new interpretation of the basis for removal
jurisdiction in Moitie (that the federal courts have removal jurisdiction when the state
claim would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata) is subject to criticism. Id. If the
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Applying the foregoing rationale to Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit held that the investors' state claims should be remanded to
state court.97 Their state claims were not barred by res judicata
because a final judgment had not been entered on the federal
action.98 The investors' state claims were not preempted by federal law and therefore could be properly pursued under state
law. 99 The state law claims did not fall within the federal court's
original jurisdiction because they were never joined with the
plaintiffs' federal claims.loo The federal court could not exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims because the plaintiff did not choose to file the state claims in the same complaint
as the federal claims. lol The plaintiff was therefore permitted to
assert parallel state and federal claims, and removal jurisdiction
did not attach to the state claims under the "artful pleading
doctrine. mo2
V. CRITIQUE
The Ninth Circuit significantly elucidated the applicability
of the artful pleading doctrine in the removal context in Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities. lOS Sullivan offered the court
an opportunity to (1) define the basis for removal jurisdiction in
Moitie;lo4 (2) step away from the court's previous explanation of
"state court is competent to apply federal res judicata in the state lawsuit," why should
the existence of a res judicata defense allow the case to be removed to federal court? Id.
Nevertheless, the Sullivan court proceeded to reason:
The federal judgment would ordinarily preclude the plaintiff
from reIitigating any federal or state claim arising out of the
same operative facts. A purported state claim based on those
facts would be in effect the same federal claim against which
the judgment had been entered. The removing court could
thus recharacterize the state claim as an artfully pleaded federal claim filed to circumvent the res judicata effect of the federal judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
97.Id.
98.Id.
99. Id. The defendants never contended that federal law preempted plaintiffs' state
law claims. Id. at 1372-73.
100. Id. at 1376.
101. Id. at 1376 n.8.
102. Id. at 1376.
103. 813 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 1373-76.
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the theoretical basis for Moitie as enunciated in Salvesonl015 ;
and (3) to impliedly reassert the preeminence of the wellpleaded complaint rule in the Ninth Circuit, carving out only a
narrow exception from it in the form of the artful pleading
doctrine. lOB

•

A careful reading of the Moitie decision gives credence to
the notion that "the task of divining Moitie's theoretical underpinnings has fallen to the lower courts and commentators."I07
Although Moitie clearly applied res judicata to the state claims
filed after final judgment was rendered on the federal claim, the
basis upon which the federal court approved removal jurisdiction was not articulated. lOB Because the defendants in Sullivan
sought to apply the artful pleading doctrine to permit removal
in a non-preemption setting, a rationale for the Supreme Court's
use of the artful pleading doctrine to permit removal in Moitie
was critical. lo9 Even though both Sullivan and Moitie involved
artful pleading and removal in a non-preemption setting, it must
be noted that the facts of the two cases are very dissimilar. In
Sullivan the plaintiff asserted parallel state and federal claims,
and pursued both claims independently from the beginning of
litigation. llo In Moitie the plaintiff did not object to federal jurisdiction over his lawsuit, and only after his federal lawsuit was
dismissed did he file an action in state court based on the same
facts. l l l It is ironic that the Ninth Circuit struggled in Sullivan
with the rationale underlying removal in Moitie. The Supreme
Court in its footnote approving removal in Moitie simply agreed
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had agreed with
the district court that the claims presented were "federal in
nature. "I 12
105.Id.
106. Id. at 1375-76.
107. Id. at 1373.
108. Federated Department Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2. (1981).
109. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1373. The Second Circuit in Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 277 (1986) was faced with
the same problem and gave its own interpretation to the rationale for removal in Moitie.
See supra note 94.
110. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370-71.
111. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 395-96.
112. Moitie, 452 U.S. at 397 n.2. "The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District
Court's conclusion that Brown II was properly removed to federal court, reasoning that
the claims presented were 'federal in nature.' We agree that at least some of the claims
had a sufficient federal character to support removal." Id.
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The Ninth Circuit once before addressed the rationale underlying Moitie's removal jurisdiction. In Salveson v. Western
States Bankcard Association1I8 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
removal in Moitie rested on an election of forum rationale.1I4 In
Salveson the court was faced with a case very similar to Moitie.
Because the Supreme Court, in Moitie, had approved removal
under the artful pleading doctrine when the plaintiff filed a suit
in state court after a judgment had already been rendered in
plaintiff's federal suit, it would seem that the basis for removal
was not so important as the outcome-that the state action
must be banned by the doctrine of res judicata. lu> In Sullivan
however, plaintiff had been pursuing both his federal court action and his state claims from the beginning of the lawsuit.1I6 If
the Moitie decision really meant that a defendant could remove
a state action to federal court whenever plaintiff pursued a federal remedy, then removal based upon an election of forum theory could serve as the rationale for removing state claims to federal court whenever the plaintiff also chose to pursue a parallel
federal claim in federal court, precisely the position taken by the
defendant in Sullivan.ll7
The Sullivan court was correct to retreat from any interpretation of Moitie that would permit such an enormous expansion
of removal jurisdiction and a departure from settled precedent
permitting concurrent progress of parallel lawsuits through the
federal and state courts. lIS Because an election of forum rationale1I9 could arguably expand removal jurisdiction well beyond
113. Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423, (9th Cir. 1984).
114. [d at 1425-29. The facts in Salveson were very similar to those in Moitie. [d.
After summary judgment was entered against plaintiff's federal law claim, plaintiff filed
an action in state court based on the same facts. [d. The state action was removed to
federal court and dismissed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal court had
removal jurisdiction because plaintiff elected to proceed in federal court, therefore the
state court action really arose under federal law. [d.
115. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1432. "We view the Supreme Court's holding as standing
at least for the proposition that if a state claim is found on removal to be an artfully
pleaded federal claim which was previously before the federal court and was dismissed,
then res judicata is to be applied." [d.
116. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1370.
117. [d. at 1374.
118. See generally Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal,
and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812
(surveying removal jurisdiction and characterizing it as being narrowly construed with
courts giving deference to the well-pleaded complaint rule).
119. Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1429 (quoting the lower court decision in the same case:
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what the Supreme Court envisioned when it decided Moitie, the
Sullivan court was wise to step away from its reasoning in
Salveson. 120 What the court has effectively done in Sullivan is to
limit Moitie to its facts, and to permit removal only when plaintiff's state law claim would be barred by res judicata. l2l Limiting
the effect of Moitie appears to be entirely appropriate in light of
Moitie's poorly defined theoretical underpinnings. 122 By limiting
Moitie to its facts, the court also wisely limited the artful pleading doctrine to a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 123 The narrow exception means that the Ninth Circuit will
continue to look only to the face of the complaint to determine
the existence of a federal claim. Removal under the artful pleading exception will continue to be appropriate only where plaintiff's claim is completely preempted by federal law or when the
state claim is barred by res judicata.124
The Sullivan court noted that if the federal court's removal
jurisdiction was broadened to permit removal of state claims
pursued simultaneously with federal actions, judicial economy
would be served by hearing as many of the plaintiff's claims together as possible.1215 The court further noted that "complex
state and federal actions proceeding simultaneously against the
same parties [may] pose grave problems in the management of
litigation."126 The court correctly concluded, however, that issues of judicial economy and litigation management are beyond
the scope of the removal statute and the removal jurisdiction of
the federal courts.127 Other means are available to courts to coordinate duplicative state and federal litigation. Procedures
Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1981»:
"[Tlhe conclusion of artful pleading is properly drawn when the plaintiff 'by his own
conduct, either by filing originally in federal court or by acceding to federal jurisdiction
after removal, has made his claim a federal one.' "
120. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1374.
121. Id. at 1376.
122. Id. at 1373.
123. Id. at 1375-76.
124. Id. at 1375 (quoting Salveson). The artful pleading doctrine should be invoked
"only in exceptional circumstances." Salveson, 731 F.2d at 1427.
125. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1374. Under the particular facts of this case, parallel state
and federal claims may have led to some judicial economy by avoiding duplicative discovery. Reply Brief for Appellant at 7-10, Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, 813 F.2d
1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2961).
126. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1377 (quoting California v. California & Hawaiian Sugar
Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979».
127. Id. at 1377.
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available include stays of either the state or the federal claims to
permit litigation of one type of claim at a time,128 injunctions,129
and the doctrine of res judicata. ISO
VI. CONCLUSION
By holding that the artful pleading doctrine as articulated
in Federated Department Stores v. Moitie 1S1 and Salveson v.
Western States Bankcard Association1S2 does not support removal of an independent, parallel state claim to federal court,
the Ninth Circuit has moved to limit the artful pleading doctrine. Removal is permitted only in a narrow range of cases that
are either completely preempted by federal law or that have
been precluded by federal res judicata. ISS The court's inquiry
into potential removal jurisdiction will continue to begin with
the traditional "face of the complaint" rule. 1M The court has
narrowly defined its willingness to "look behind the complaint"
and apply the artful pleading doctrine.

Susan H. Handelman *

128. See generally Note, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 641
(1977) (concerning when federal courts should stay actions before them in order to protect parties from having to litigate actions in state and in federal courts concurrently).
129. See, e.g., Golden v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 786 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986).
See generally Annotation, Stay of Action in Federal Court Until Determination of Similar Action Pending in State Court,_ 5 AL.R. FED. 10 (1970) (collection of cases where
courts have considered whether and when they can order a stay of action in federal court
to allow determination of a similar action in state court).
130. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d § 31.32 (1986) describes the role of res
judicata as follows: "Federal law, however, generally permits multiple actions between
the same parties to be pursued simultaneously, whether in other federal courts or in
state courts, until a judgment is obtained that will be given effect in other cases under
the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion." Id.
131. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
132. 731 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984).
133. Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1376.
134. See supra note 31.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989.
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